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Abstract
Due to underlying technological and organizational differences, industries differ
in their need for external finance. Since services provided by the financial sector
are largely immobile across countries, the pattern of industrial specialization
should be influenced by the degree of financial development. We find this effect
to be strong. In fact, the financial sector has greater impact on industrial
specialization among OECD countries than differences in human and physical
capital. We also show that the causality indeed run from the financial sector to
specialization. Further, financial sectors are a source of comparative advantage
in a way consistent with the Hecksher-Ohlin-Vanek model. Results on which
aspects of financial systems that are of importance for specialization and
comparative advantage are also presented.
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1.  Introduction
In a modern economy, financial markets and financial intermediaries play an
important role by mobilizing savings, allocating credit, and facilitating the hedging,
pooling and pricing of risks.
1 That a well-functioning financial sector has strong,
positive effects on a country’s aggregate growth opportunities has been shown by, for
example, Levine et al. (2000). Since the need for financing depends on the type of
activity firms engage in, it would be surprising if the growth effect was completely
symmetric across sectors and firms. Recent research (Rajan and Zingales, 1998;
Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998) has indeed found that industries and firms
heavily dependent on external financing grow faster in countries with well-developed
financial systems. Given these empirical results, it is only natural to expect trading
and specialization patterns to be influenced by the financial sector.
This paper adds to earlier research, first by reporting that differences in financial
development among OECD countries have an even greater impact on the pattern of
specialization than differences in human or physical capital and verifying that this is
not due to reversed causality.  Second, we find that well-developed financial
intermediaries and markets have a positive effect on the content of external financing
in net trade. In other words, the financial sector is a source of comparative advantage
in a way consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model.
An obvious prediction of the standard HOV-model is that a country well endowed
with institutions of relatively high quality should tend to specialize in the production
of goods relatively intense in the use of services provided by these institutions.
Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) model such a case and find that differences between
countries in their domestic institutions of credit contract enforcement may give rise to
comparative advantage. This study treats financial markets and intermediaries as
factors in the production of goods and services. A necessary condition for a
production factor to give rise to comparative advantage is that it is immobile across
countries. Although it is not obvious that this condition is fulfilled, we would not
expect strong growth effects of domestic financial development, like those found in
the empirical growth literature, if financial services were internationally mobile. More3
directly, Jayrathne and Strahan (1996) show that the services provided by the financial
sector are indeed highly immobile geographically, even within the USA.
This paper belongs to the small empirical literature investigating the effects of
institutions on trade. In Svaleryd and Vlachos (2001), we find an economically
significant relation between the degree of financial development and aggregate
openness to trade. Anderson and Marcouiller (1999) find corruption and imperfect
contract enforcement to be important negative determinants of aggregate bilateral
trading volumes. To our knowledge, the present paper is the first to analyze
empirically how financial markets shape industry specialization patterns and
international competitiveness.
2 More generally speaking, ours is also the first paper
empirically documenting that the institutional features of a society can give rise to
comparative advantage. It contributes to the literature on financial markets and growth
by focusing on absolute levels of production rather than growth rates. Finally, we
provide new, indirect evidence on the relative merits of different financial systems.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we start by discussing different
aspects of the financial sector. Section 3 describes the measure of industry
specialization, the data and results on the determinants of industry specialization. This
section also includes results on causality. Section 4 studies the effect of the financial
endowment on factor content of net trade, and Section 5 concludes.
2.  The financial sector
In this study the financial sector is viewed as a factor of production. A country
relatively well endowed with well-functioning financial institutions should thus tend
to specialize in sectors relatively intensive in the use of the services provided by these
institutions. Our main approach in order to investigate this hypothesis will be to
consider the pattern of industrial specialization. Specifically, industry-specific
measure of financial intensity is interacted with country-specific measures of financial
endowment (or development). A second method is to consider the content of external
                                                                                                                                                              
1 The contribution of the financial sector to GDP is large. Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (1996) present
estimates varying from around 5% of GDP in the US to 9% in Japan during the years around 1990.
2 After the completion of this paper, Ross Levine brought the independent work by Beck (2001) to our
attention. Beck addresses the same questions, using basically the same methods as we do. He does not,4
finance in net trade. Basically, this approach amounts to investigate if the financial
system can be a source of comparative advantage. The prediction is that a country
endowed with well-developed financial markets will be a net exporter of external
finance.
2.1.  The financial sector as an endowment
What do we mean by our claim that the financial sector effectively works as an
internationally immobile factor endowment? The question is important since Wood
(1994) has shown that the inclusion of internationally mobile production factors in
studies of the factor content of trade can yield incorrect predictions. Specifically, he
argues that capital cannot be a source of comparative advantage because capital
mobility has (more or less) equalized real interest rates across countries. This line of
reasoning abstracts, however, from the well-known imperfections of financial markets
arising from informational asymmetries and conflicting interests between creditors
and debtors however.
Informational problems give rise to financial intermediaries specializing in project
evaluation, monitoring and information dissemination, which mitigate the negative
effects of market imperfections. Two countries with the same real interest rate, but
with financial sectors of differing quality, are thus, in practice, differently endowed
with financial capital. There is a huge literature on the underlying causes of, and
possible remedies to, these problems. The degree of project uncertainty (Huang and
Xu, 1999) and the share of investments in intangible assets (Myers and Majuf, 1984)
are just two of the factors that make financial intermediation more important.
Financial intermediaries thus do not just raise money for financing investments in
physical capital. In fact, it is difficult to have a clear prior on the factor content of the
investments made with financial capital; in our view the financial sector is best seen
as a type of human or organizational capital, specialized in overcoming market
distortions in financing.
But are not the services provided by the financial sector internationally tradable,
thereby erasing this source of comparative advantage? Basically, the finding that the
                                                                                                                                                              
however, control for a wider range of production factors. Hence, he cannot relate the size of the effect
of financial markets on the pattern of specialization to the effect of other factors.5
domestic level of financial development is an important determinant of firm
(Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998), industry (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) and
country level economic growth (eg. Levine et al., 2000) suggest otherwise. If capital
markets were indeed well integrated, the level of domestic financial development
would be of little importance for local growth opportunities. More direct evidence is
found in Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), who show that financial services are difficult
to trade geographically even within a country. Finally, by investigating companies’
cross-listing decisions, Pagano et al. (2001) conclude that geography is still of
importance for financing.
All these studies demonstrate that how internationally mobile financial capital is put
to use to a large extent depends on the immobile institutional features of a society,
summarized in measures of financial development. The problems pointed out by
Wood (1994) of including measures of internationally traded physical capital in HOV-
studies hence do not apply to the endowment of financial intermediaries. It is
therefore reasonable to expect countries with well-functioning financial markets to
have a comparative advantage in the production of financial services, and to specialize
in industries highly dependent on external financing.
A potential problem that plagues this type of studies of the financial sector is the
question of causality. A well-developed financial sector may be a result of high
demand for financial services, suggesting that causality run in the opposite direction.
In our case this would mean that the industry structure affects the demand for
financial services and hence the level of financial development. This legitimate
concern will be addressed in the empirical part of the paper.
2.2.  Views of the financial system
Although the above discussion is quite straightforward, it is also abstract. In reality,
the financial system is not an entity that develops linearly along a single dimension,
rather, there are intrinsic differences between different systems and there is a huge
literature discusses their pros and cons. Traditionally, the debate has focused on bank-
based versus market-based financial systems (see Allen and Gale, 2000 for a modern
treatment of these issues).6
A bank-based system may be superior to a market-based system because of the long-
term relationships between banks and firms. The long-term relationships may increase
investors’ incentives to acquire information about the firm and exercise corporate
control (see e.g. Stiglitz, 1985 and Shleifer and Vishny,1986). A well-developed stock
market, however, may aggregate information about both firms and markets in a way
not possible for an individual bank. Moreover, corporate control may be facilitated by
stock markets through compensation schemes that are linked to stock market
performance. It is also likely that banks that issue debt have an incentive to be biased
against high-risk projects, which can explain why riskier industries attract more
external funding in market-based economies. Another explanation might be that a
well functioning stock market also expands the possibilities for risk diversification,
thereby making high-risk projects more attractive for the individual investor.
Recently, new perspectives based on the overall efficiency of the financial sector, and
its legal environment, have widened the debate on the relative merits of different
systems. A possibility expressed by, for example, Huybens and Smith (1999) is that
markets and banks are complements rather than substitutes and it is the efficiency of
the financial sector as a whole that is of importance. Finally, as La Porta et al. (2000)
have stressed, the legal system is key to the working of the financial system.
Especially, the legal system protects creditors and minority shareholders against
expropriation by majority shareholders and managers. Legal investor protection is
therefore associated with effective corporate governance and constitutes a better
staring point for cross-country comparisons of financial systems than the bank versus
market framework.
Thus, there are four main views of the financial sector: the market based and the bank
based views, the view that it is the overall size and efficiency that is of importance,
and the view that it is the legal protection of creditors and shareholders that matters.
3.  The pattern of specialization
We first approach the question how a country’s endowment of financial services
affects international trade by considering the pattern of industrial specialization. The
hypothesis is that the international competitiveness of an industry in a certain country7
depends on the resource endowments of that country and the input requirements of the
industry. Balassa (1979, 1986) pioneered this approach.
One obvious candidate as an indicator of international competitiveness and industrial
specialization is the ratio between production and consumption, as suggested by




















where Qij is production, Cij is consumption, Mij is imports, and Xij exports of good i in
country j. It should be clear that when rij is greater than one, country j is a net exporter
of good i, whereas a value lower than one indicates that the country is a net importer.
In the analysis, rij is regressed on a set of variables constructed by interacting the
input requirements of each industry i with the country characteristics of each country
j. The larger the value of rij, the more specialized is country j in industry i.
In order to pick up fixed industry and country effects, a set of industry and country
dummies is added to the regression. We take the logarithm of rij to ensure that the
trade imbalances end up in the country fixed effects. To see this, consider the case of
balanced trade. It must then be true that







For each country j there exists a parameter βj such that
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By scaling each element in the production vector by (1+βj), a hypothetical value of
production under balanced trade is derived. The relationship between the measure of
specialization under balanced and unbalanced trade can then be expressed as8
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By taking the logarithms of (3.4), it should be clear that the country-fixed effects
capture the trade imbalance parameter (1+βj).
An alternative measure of industry specialization would be the one used by Balassa
(1986), namely
(3.5)  ). /( ) ( ij ij ij ij M X M X + −
The main difference between this measure and rij is that it can take on a negative
value. Thus, it cannot be adjusted for trade imbalances by taking on logarithms.
Although the approach behind (3.1) and (3.5) is inspired by the HOV-theory, it should
not be considered as a formal test of the HOV-theory. Leamer and Levinsohn (1995)
raise theoretical objections to this type of study when the number of goods is larger
than the number of production factors. Bowen and Sveikauskas (1992) demonstrate,
however, that these theoretical objections are of little practical importance in actual
empirical analysis. The patterns of industry specialization are shown to be consistent
with the net exports of factor services, especially for broad aggregates of production
factors. What is important, though, is to adjust the dependent variable for trade
imbalances. For this reason, we will mainly focus on rij, and keep the Balassa-
measure for testing the robustness of the results.
3
3.1.  Estimation
In order to estimate the impact of financial development on the pattern of industry
specialization, we use data on industry factor input requirements and country-factor
endowments. The expected sign of the interaction variables is usually positive, which
means that a country well endowed with a certain factor will specialize in the
industries with large input requirements of that factor.
This means that we estimate the following relationship:9
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where i is the industry index, j is the country index, k is the factor index, Di is a
dummy for industry i, Dj is a dummy for country j, αik is the input requirement of
factor k in sector i, ENDjk is the endowment of factor k in country j, and εij is the error
term.
3.2.  Financial intensity
The basic premise of this paper is that there are intrinsic reasons, for example
technological and organizational, why industries differ in their dependence on
external financing and that these differences persist across countries.
4 In the empirical
trade literature, such assumptions are quite standard regarding production factors such
as human and physical capital. It is even standard procedure to assume the inter-
industry ranking of factor intensities are stable over time. Making this assumption for
financial dependence might therefore be more difficult empirically than conceptually.
As an indicator of financial intensity, we will use the measure of financial dependence
developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Their paper tackles the problem of how to
measure industry differences in the dependence on external financing.
5 They note that
when financial markets work without friction, the supply of external financing will be
very elastic. Differences in the actual use of external financing in such an economy
will hence mainly reflect differences in demand for this type of funding. By arguing
that the U.S. financial markets are the most advanced in the world, Rajan and Zingales
use data on the actual external financing pattern of U.S. firms to calculate their
measure of financial dependence. More precisely, their measure is capital
expenditures minus cash flow from operations divided by capital expenditures. To
smooth fluctuations, they use data on the firm’s external financing and capital
expenditure over a 10-year period. To prevent that excessive weight is given to large
                                                                                                                                                              
3 The correlation between the two indicators of specialization is 0.69.
4 Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) assumes in their theoretical model that some industries require more
credit to cover selling and distribution costs.
5 Beck and Levine (2001) basically employ the same methodology as Rajan and Zingales, when asking
if a bank-based or a market-based financial system is most conductive to the growth of financially
dependent industries.10
firms, industry values are calculated as medians rather than means. According to this
measure, drug and medicines (ISIC 3522) is the most dependent, while the tobacco
industry (ISIC 314) is least dependent on external finance.
3.3  Financial endowment
Ideally, a measure of financial sector endowment should gauge how effectively
financial intermediaries and markets manage to mobilize and allocate capital. Thus,
the ideal measure of financial development should be related to the variety of
intermediaries and markets available, the efficiency with which they evaluate and
monitor firms, and the legal and regulatory framework assuring performance.
Although no perfect measures are available, the indicators developed by Beck et al.
(1999) proxy for the different aspects of the financial system outlined in Section 2.2.
The first proxies are related to the size and activity of the stock market, and are hence
related to the market-based view of the financial system. We use the stock market
capitalization to GDP ratio (MCAP), the value of listed shares to GDP, as an indicator
of the size of the stock market. Second, the total value of stock market trade to GDP
(STRADE) is used to proxy for stock market activity. Both these indicators suffer
from the potential problem of capturing the forward-looking expectations by
economic agents. If, for example, high growth and hence high profits are anticipated,
both MCAP and STRADE will increase. Although this could result in severe
problems when considering the effect of these variables on growth as in Levine and
Zervos (1998), it is not so much of a problem since we here study within country and
across industry differences. Another potential problem is that none of these measures
reflect the amount of financing actually obtained by firms.
A commonly used proxy for the degree of overall financial development is the liquid
liabilities to GDP ratio (LLY). This proxy is usually employed as an indicator of
financial depth and has the advantage of being available for a wide range of countries.
It is not, however, a direct measure of the financial sector’s capacity to generate funds
and may be most appropriate when other indicators are unavailable.
A more direct aggregate indicator of the activity of financial intermediaries is the
amount of credit given in an economy. More precisely, we use the ratio of private11
credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions (DC) to GDP to proxy
for this. One virtue of this measure is that it isolates credit issued to the private sector
from the private sector. This measure has been used to proxy the activity of financial
intermediaries. However, perhaps it is really a proxy for the activity in the bank-
sector. Next, we include indicators of the efficiency and market structure of
commercial banks. A potential measure of how efficient commercial banks channel
funds from savers to investors is the net interest margin, i.e. the accounting value of a
bank’s net interest revenue as share of its total assets (MARGIN). This indicator
serves as a proxy for the wedge between the prices faced by the parties on either side
of a loan transaction. We define (CONC) as the ratio of the three largest banks’ assets
to total banking sector assets, as an indicator of market structure. A highly
concentrated banking sector might be less competitive and hence less efficient than a
competitive one.
6
The next set of proxies is more related to regulatory efficiency and hence to the
potential of raising funds, rather than the actual outcome. For this purpose, we (again)
follow Rajan and Zingales and use the accounting standards for each country in 1990
(ACSTAN). International comparisons of accounting standards are made by the
Center for International Financial Analysis and Research. This proxy is supposed to
reflect the potential for obtaining financing by low information costs. Hence, it can be
considered as an overall indicator of the quality of information available to investors.
As a check for the consistency of this index, we also make use of the 1983 accounting
standards (ACSTAN83).
7  Finally, we turn to indicators of the legal rights of creditors
and minority shareholders. MINORITY is an index from zero to six of how well
protected minority shareholders are. The higher is the value of this index, the better
the legal protection against expropriation. CREDITOR is an index between zero and
four, increasing in the legal rights of creditors relative to management and other
stakeholders.
                                                       
6 As will be discussed later, competition in the banking sector can have both positive and negative
effects for the generation of external financing to firms.
7 The correlation between ACSTAN and ACSTAN83 is 0.70. ACSTAN83 is not available for Mexico.12
3.4.  Data on other endowments and intensities
In order to measure the input requirements of human capital, we use the share of
workers with post-secondary education in each industry, weighted by the relative size
of the respective industry. The average years of secondary schooling in the population
above 25 is used as a proxy for the national endowments of human capital.
Whether or not to include physical capital in the analysis is an open question. The
answer is contingent on the mobility of physical capital; if it is a mobile factor, it
should not be included. We choose to follow the convention and include physical
capital, especially as we want to ensure that the indicators of financial dependence
and endowments do not proxy for any other production factor. Physical capital
intensities are calculated as the OECD-averaged capital formation to value added
ratio, while physical capital per worker measure capital endowments.
8 To capture the
effect of natural resource endowments, the stock of agricultural- and forestland per
worker is also employed. The intensity of the former is just a dummy for food
production, whereas the latter is calculated using Swedish input-output data. For
further details on all variables and sources, see the appendix.
3.5.  Trade data
Production and trade data by three and four-digit ISIC industry codes for the OECD
countries are obtained from the OECD/STAN database. Since we are forced to
combine different data sources, our final data set includes data on 32 manufacturing
industries in 20 countries. In other words, it must be kept in mind that trade in
services and raw materials is not included in this study.
3.6.  Results
Table 1 shows the results from the estimation of (3.6). Seven of the ten interactions
between financial dependence and financial development are statistically significant
and all have the expected signs. Further, all other interaction variables are positive as
expected, but the interaction of agricultural inputs is not significant. Given the highly
                                                       
8 There are alternative ways of measuring both human- and physical capital intensities and
endowments. We have employed several  ways (see appendix) as a check on the robustness of the
results.13
regulated agricultural sector in most OECD-countries, it might not be surprising that
natural advantage is not a key determinant of the pattern of agricultural production.
Establishing statistical significance is a first step, but is the effect of financial markets
on the pattern of specialization of economic significance? In column one, we see that
the coefficient on the interaction term between financial dependence and the market
capitalization ratio takes the value of 0.194. In order to interpret the economic
magnitude of this coefficient, the following experiment is helpful. Suppose that
shipbuilding (the industry at the 75
th percentile of financial intensity) was located in
Canada (the country at the 75
th percentile of financial endowment), rather than in Italy
(the country at the 25
th percentile of financial endowment). Further, consider the same
switch of locations for beverages (the industry at the 25
th percentile of financial
intensity). How much larger would the shipbuilding sector be if reallocated from Italy
to Canada, compared to the same change in locations for beverages, given that all
other variables take on their average values?
9 In specification (1), this exercise leads
to a change in ln(rij) by 0.103. For all industries, the average value of ln(rij) is –0.164.
Hence, the switch of countries would lead to a 10.8 percent increase in rij, compared
to the average value. For the other (statistically significant) proxies of financial
endowment, the same number is 12.2, 5.4, 7.0, 6.1, 8.7, and 8.5 percent. In
comparison, the same thought experiment with respect to human and physical capital
gives an increase in rij by around 5 and 6 percent, respectively. The impact of the
financial system on the pattern of specialization must thus be considered as very large.
Turning to the specific indicators of financial development, we see that both stock
market indicators (MCAP, STRADE) are statistically significant. This shows that a
well-developed stock market is an important source of competitive advantage among
financially dependent industries. The liquid liabilities ratio (LLY) seems to be of no
importance for industrial specialization and is not even close to statistical
significance. The impact of the activity of financial intermediaries (DC) statistically
significant but the size is among the smallest (although still large compared to the
effect of human- and physical capital).
                                                       
9 This thought experiment is from Rajan and Zingales (1998). Mathematically, this means the following
calculation:
COEFF×{FINDEP75 × (FINDEV75-FINDEV25) – FINDEP25 × (FINDEV75-FINDEV25)}14
[Table 1]
Turning to the efficiency of the banking sector, the net interest margin (MARGIN)
does not affect the pattern of specialization. The concentration index (CONC), which
proxies for the degree of competition in the banking sector is, however, of
importance. The result for banking concentration is interesting since it indirectly
suggests that financially dependent industries have better access to credit when the
banking industry is competitive. This contradicts Petersen and Rajan (1995) who
show that competition in the credit market can be detrimental to the formation of
firm-creditor relationships. The reason is that when creditors cannot hold equity
claims, and the market is competitive, the creditor is forced to break even every
period. For high-risk projects, this implies a very high interest rate that can distort the
firms’ incentives. In a monopolistic market, on the other hand, the creditor can cross-
subsidy the firm over time – to the mutual benefit of both creditor and lender.
10
Rather, the result in column 5 constitutes indirect support of the view put forward by
Rajan (1992), namely that banks with market power extract rents and reduce the
firms’ incentives to invest.
Accounting standards (ACSTAN, ACSTAN83), the indicators of the aggregate
quality of information available to investors, are also significant – both statistically
and economically. Given the severe informational problems in the financial markets,
it should not come as a surprise that good information has a positive effect on the
generation of external financing.
Finally, the results are mixed concerning the view that the legal protection of
outsiders against expropriation attempts by insiders. Minority shareholder protection
(MINORITY) does not seem to affect the pattern of specialization, while the
protection of creditors (CREDITOR) does.
                                                       
10 Petersen and Rajan (1995) also provide empirical evidence from the US, supporting this view. Using
the same methodology as Rajan and Zingales (1998), Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) find that a
concentrated banking sector supports the growth of financially dependent industries.15
To determine which aspects of financial development are of most importance for
industrial specialization, we include different interactions between financial
dependence and financial development simultaneously. The high correlation between
several indicators prevents us from using all of them in the same regression. Rather,
they are entered two by two, based on the aspects they are intended to measure.
[Table 2 here]
The first four columns of Table 2 indicate that the stock market indicator STRADE
dominate the other variables (results when using MCAP rather than STRADE are
essentially the same). The level of domestic credit DC is dominated by the other
indicators, while bank sector concentration remains important when entered together
with accounting standards and creditor rights. Accounting standards remain
significant in all specifications. Hence, stock market development and accounting
standards seem to be the most important determinants of the pattern of specialization.
3.7.  Sensitivity analysis
There are many different ways of measuring most of the variables that enter
regression 3.6. Since we want to ensure that the results are not due to our choice of
indicators, we perform a number of sensitivity tests. Each cell of Table 3 refers to an
individual regression, and shows the estimates of the interaction terms between
financial dependence and financial development.
In row 1, we replace Ln(rij) with the Balassa (1986) measure of industry
specialization:  ) /( ) ( ij ij ij ij M X M X + − . The results are remarkably consistent with the
ones in Table 1. Accounting standards for 1990 lose their significance, as does the
index of creditor rights. The indicators of financial depth and domestic credit, on the
other hand, now gain statistical significance. Making the same analysis for the size of
the effect as for ln(rij) in section 3.6, we obtain an increase in the dependent variable
by 0.075, 0.090, 0.031, 0.062, 0.063, 0.052, and 0.044 for each of the significant
interaction terms. For human capital, the size-effect is around 0.06 and for physical
capital 0.025. Thus, the large effect on the pattern of specialization is not due to the
choice of dependent variable.16
In row 2, the human capital indicator is replaced by an interaction term where the
number of scientists per worker in each country is used as country endowment of
human capital.
11 In this specification, all interactions between financial dependence
and financial development except the one based on financial depth (LLY) are
statistically significant. The point estimates are very similar to the ones in Table 1. If
we calculate the size-effect for this indicator of human capital, we get a value of
around 6 percent, roughly the same as when secondary schooling is used.
12
In row 3, physical capital intensities are replaced by the British industry level capital
stock to value added ratio, which is done to verify that the results are not contingent
upon the flow-measure previously used.
 13 The size-effect for this indicator is around
2 percent and we can once again verify the results from Table 1.
In row 4, we exclude the US from the regression since the indicator of financial
dependence is based on calculations on US firms.
14 This exclusion leaves the results
unchanged.
Finally, we include interaction terms between industry intensity and country
abundance of electricity and steel. Although these inputs are tradable, and hence
should arguably be excluded from the regression, we include them to verify that the
results for financial development are not spurious (similar production factors are also
included by e.g. Ellison and Glaeser 1999, and Gustavsson et al. 1999). Both the new
variables are positive and significant but the basic results are, if anything,
strengthened by their inclusion.
                                                       
11 The correlation between SECSCH and SCIENW is 0.53.
12 Hanushek and Kimko (2000) measure labor force quality by using international mathematics and
science test scores. They can thereby avoid the unrealistic assumption that schooling is of equal quality
in different countries. Moreover, the use of test scores reduces the likelihood of proxying for general
development effects rather than human capital. Using their indicator (HCQ1) rather than quantity based
indicators such as SECSCH and SCIENW does not alter the results in this paper. The size effect of
HCQ1 is 4.8 percent (results available upon request).
13 The correlation between CVAI and CAPVA is –0.07 (not significant). That the two measures are not
correlated is of course naturally a matter of concern. CVAI, however, is highly correlated with electric




A potentially very important problem is the possibility of reverse causality: the
demand for a well-developed financial sector may be higher in countries with
industrial structures that are intensive in the use of external financing. Hence, the
industrial structure could determine the development of the financial system rather
than the other way around. Although this might be the case also for other factors of
production, the problem is perhaps more severe for financial endowment since
changes in for example market capitalization and the amount of credit can occur faster
than changes in, say, the stock of human capital. This problem could strike with
greater force against some of our proxies. Stock market turnover and the
concentration of the banking sector are less likely to be affected by reverse causality
than market capitalization and the amount of credit, since the latter two are direct
indicators of the level of equity and debt in the economy. Accounting standards and
the legal variables are quite persistent over time, but are on the other hand direct
policy variables that can be adjusted according to industry demands. Here, we
approach the problem by instrumenting for financial development in two different
ways.
A study by Guiso et al. (2001) demonstrates that social capital is an important
determinant of financial development. The reason is that trust between the agents is an
intrinsic feature of financial relationships. Since it is hard to imagine that the level of
social cooperation in a society is determined by the industry structure, we follow this
idea by instrumenting for financial development with an index of the strength of
norms in civic cooperation (CIVIC) from Knack and Keefer (1997).
15 It is important
that the instruments are correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable since
even a small correlation between the instruments and the error can seriously bias the
results (see e.g. Bound et al (1995)). However, as indicated by the F statistic of the
instrument in the first-stage estimation there is a strong and significant effect of this
                                                                                                                                                              
14 It is by no means obvious why this should force us to exclude the US from the analysis. Rajan and
Zingales do that in their paper, however, so we follow their example.
15 The index is constructed using the World Values Surveys which contains survey data from several
thousand households in 29 market economies. See the paper by Knack and Keefer (1997) for a closer
description of this variable.18
instrument on almost all proxies of financial endowment. There is also no correlation
between the residuals of the second-stage regressions and the instrument. Hence,
CIVIC seems to be a good instrument.
The results from this exercise are presented in the upper panel of Table 4. In general,
the point estimates are larger than from the corresponding regressions in Table 1, even
though the significance levels are somewhat lower. The main changes are that the
interaction terms using liquid liabilities and minority shareholder protection are now
statistically significant, while the ones using bank sector concentration and accounting
standards from 1983 are not. Since CIVIC show little correlation with bank sector
concentration it is not surprising that there is no significant effect.
[Table 3 here]
La Porta et al. (1998) find that a country’s protection of corporate shareholders and
creditors is determined by its legal origin. In the lower panel of Table 4, we
instrument for financial development using each country’s legal origin as an
instrument for financial endowment. These instruments are a set of dummy variables
taking a value of one if a country is of British, Scandinavian, German, and French
legal origin, respectively. To these dummies, we add the “rule of law” index produced
by Business International Corporation. This instrument should be correlated with the
financial endowment since the enforcement of contracts is essential for the working of
financial sector. Although these instruments have successfully been used in other
studies (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1998), we have some worries that there is too little
variation in these variables given that our own analysis is limited to the OECD.
However, the F statistics of the instruments in the first-stage regression indicate that
they work well. Further, the tests of overidentifying restrictions show that the
instruments are valid. These tests are performed by regressing the residual from the
second stage regression on the instruments. See Table 4 for details.
The results from Table 1 are quite robust to the instrumentation, although the
significance levels of the variables are generally somewhat lower. One exception is
that CREDITOR gains both in statistical significance and size: the point estimate19
increases from 0.07 to 0.25. If we were to take this estimate seriously, an increase in
the creditor rights’ index from 1 to 3 would imply an increase in rij by 23 percent.
4.  The factor content of trade
Our second approach to study how financial development affects the trade pattern is
to consider the factor content of net trade. Thus, we are analyzing if the financial
system is a source of comparative advantage. In our case the prediction of the HOV-
model is that a country with a well-developed financial sector will be a net exporter of
external finance.
4.1.  Estimation and data
Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) have shown how to derive an empirical measure of the
factor content of net trade, somewhat consistent with the HOV-theory though relaxing
the assumption of balanced trade. In the present paper, we modify the Leamer-
Levinsohn measure in the same way as Lundberg and Wikner (1997). More precisely,
we calculate the following measure




ik ij jk f m f x Z / ,
where xij is the share of exports of sector i in country j, mij is the share of imports of
sector i in country j, and fik is the input-requirement of factor k in sector i. Regardless
of the trade balance, the ratio carries information about the relative factor content of
exports to imports. Specifically, if Zjk >1 exports are more concentrated to k-intensive
goods than imports.
16
We again use the Rajan and Zingales (1998) indicator of financial dependence as a
proxy for the industry-requirements of external financing, as discussed previously
(FINDEP). Likewise, we use the same indicators of financial development as before
to proxy for the country endowment of financial services. In this section, as well as
before, we hope to discriminate between what aspects of the financial system that are
of importance for comparative advantage.20
The reason why we do not use exactly the same measure of factor content of net trade
as the one suggested by Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) is that this would require data
on world factor endowment of financial services. The meaning of this is somewhat
difficult to grasp. Rather than tackling these conceptual difficulties, we use the Zjk of
equation (4.1), which is very much in the spirit of the Leamer and Levinsohn
measure.
17
When constructing Zjk, we have not taken into account the services of production
factors in input goods. Thus, the net trade of external financing is calculated using
only the direct and not the indirect input of services of financial markets.
4.2.  Results
Japan has the largest net export of external financing according to definition (4.1).
Other countries with high values of Zik for the financial sector are Germany, Denmark
and the U.K. At the bottom of the list, we find countries such as New Zealand,
Australia and Greece.
A common procedure when studying the empirical support for the HOV-model is to
conduct rank and sign tests. According to the HOV-model, a country’s ranking in net
trade of a specific factor should correspond to its ranking in terms of endowment. We
use the measure of net trade in factors as defined in equation (4.1). The Kendall’s rank
test for financial endowment is presented in Table 5. The two measures of the stock
market are positively correlated with the net factor trade of external financing,
although only STRADE is statistically significant. The measures of financial debt
(LLY) and the measure of activity in financial intermediaries (DC), carry the expected
sign and are significant. Also the proxies for the effectiveness of the bank sector are,
as expected, negatively correlated with the financial dependence of net trade. Finally,
                                                                                                                                                              
16Equation (5.1) can thus be read as the factor content ratio under the restriction that balanced trade is
achieved without a change in the composition of trade. The export (import) expansion needed to get rid
of a trade deficit (surplus) is, in other words, assumed to be proportional across goods.
17 The Leamer and Levinsohn measure, under the balanced trade restriction, would take the form:
∑ ∑ ∑ − = − =
i




ij jk a s V f m f e X / 1 / ) ( σ , where Xij  is the export of good i from
country j, Vjk is country j’s endowment of factor k and  ajk is country j’s share of world endowments of
factor k.21
the correlations with the proxies related to regulatory efficiency are weaker and only
CREDITOR carry the expected sign.
18
[Table 5 here]
The correlation between the content of external finance in net trade and financial
development might be spurious for two main reasons. First, an industry’s dependence
on external financing may be a proxy for its human or physical capital intensity while
a country’s endowment of financial services may be a proxy for its endowment in
these production factors. Second, the exchange of external financing embodied in
trade in services and raw material is not included, since the data covers manufacturing
only. This may give a distorted picture of the factor content of trade for countries
where raw material or services account for a large proportion of trade. Suppose that
the external financing requirement in a sector not included in the data is very high
(low). Then, the endowment figures will overstate (understate) the supply of external
financing available for the manufacturing industry in countries where this particular
sector is large. For this reason, it is necessary to control for the endowment of other
production factors, such as human and physical capital or natural resources.
Table 6 presents results where the factor content of net trade is regressed on country
endowment variables. There is definitely support for the hypothesis that the financial
sector is a source of comparative advantage. The measures of stock market size
(MCAP) and activity (STRADE) both positively enter the regression. The same is true
for the proxy for the liquidity, or financial depth measure, of the financial sector
(LLY), and the competition indicator of the banking sector (CONC). However, DC
and the other proxy regarding the functioning of the bank sector (MARGIN) are not
statistically significant. Moreover, there is no positive effect of a country’s accounting
standards or its legal framework.
Thus, the effects of the endowment of financial intermediaries on a country’s pattern
of specialization and comparative advantage in trade are roughly the same. Notably,
                                                       
18 In order to make us more comfortable with our measure of net factor trade, we derive an equivalent
measure of comparative advantage for human capital. All correlations between the human capital22
the size and activity of the stock market and the concentration of the banking system
have a significant effect on both variables.
Admittedly, it is not easy to judge the economic effects of being endowed with well-
developed financial intermediaries, since we deal with proxies of the concept we want
to measure. To investigate the effect in the different proxies for financial
development, imagine an increase of, for example,  STRADE by one standard
deviation. This induces an increase in the net trade of external finance by 23 percent
from the mean. The impact of the other significant proxies is around 20 percent, or
around 60 percent of one standard deviation. Another way of assessing the effect of
the financial service endowment is to see what happens if it is excluded. Column 1
reveals that removing the proxy for financial development reduces the adjusted R
2 of
the regression from about 0.46 to 0.13. Thus, the statistically significant proxies have
a remarkable effect on the statistical fit of the regression.
[Table 6 here]
Since the different proxies represent different aspects of the financial system it is
interesting to investigate their relative importance. In Table 7 presents the results
when they are included in the regressions simultaneously. According to the results
both the stock-market and the effectiveness of the bank-sector are of importance for
the net factor trade of external financing.
 19 Also it seems like LLY and the proxies for
the stock-market may measure the same thing.
[Table 7]
4.3.  Sensitivity
As checks for robustness, we replace SECSCH with test-based labor force quality
indicator (HCQ1) and the number of scientists per worker (SCIENW) but this has no
effect on the results presented in Table 3 (results are not presented). We also include
other control variables in the regressions. First, GDP per capita is entered since the
                                                                                                                                                              
content of net trade and human capital endowment carry the expected sign and SCIENW and HCQ1 are
statistically significant.
19 MCAP give the same result as STRADE.23
indicators of financial development may capture some general aspect of economic
development not accounted for by the other endowment variables. Second, the public
sector is likely to be financed in other ways than through the private financial markets.
Thus, for a country with a large public sector, the true endowment of financial
services available for private manufacturing may be larger than in a country with
smaller public employment. Including these variables does not, however, affect the
results.
Finally, we run all specifications in Table 6 on an alternative measure of factor
content of net trade. This measure is constructed as the ratio of factor content in net

















where fik is the input-requirement of factor k in sector i, Xij the exports of sector i in
country j, Mij the imports of sector i in country j, Bj country j’s the trade imbalance
and Cij country j’s consumption of good i. Qiw/GDPw is the share of world output of
good i in world GDP. Once more this has little effect on the results presented in Table
6. All results remain qualitatively the same, except in the specification including
MCAP, where MCAP is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels.
As discussed earlier, causality may be a problem in this study. As before, we try to
address the problem using an instrumental variable approach. Only the proxy for
financial debt, LLY, is significant when instrumenting with CIVIC. The coefficients
of the other variables carry the expected signs but they are not statistically significant
on conventional levels. One reason is that the limited number of observations in this
section (only 20). Nor do we find any effects when using the legal origin and the rule
of law index as instruments for financial endowment.24
5.  Conclusions
The main finding of this paper is that countries with well-functioning financial
systems tend to specialize in industries highly dependent on external financing.
Although this result may not be very surprising, the size of the effect is. In fact,
differences in financial systems are more important determinants of the pattern of
specialization between OECD-countries than differences in human or physical capital.
One plausible explanation for this phenomenon is that the differences in human- and
physical capital within the OECD are fairly small. Hence, the relative size of the
effect might be smaller in a wider selection of countries. Whether this is true is a
question left for future research. We also show that the financial system gives rise to
comparative advantage in way consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model.
One may also view this paper is as a robustness test of Rajan and Zingales’ (1998)
result that financially dependent industries grow faster in countries with well-
developed financial markets. However, we approach this question by studying levels
rather than growth rates. Given that Rajan and Zingales find strong signs of
conditional convergence among industries (initially large industries tend to grow
slower than initially small industries), it is by no means obvious that their result
should carry over from growth rates to levels.
We find especially strong results for indicators of stock-market size and activity, as
well as for competition in the banking sector. They both affect industrial
specialization patterns and give rise to comparative advantage. The result that
competition in the banking-sector matters supports theories suggesting that banking
concentration limit the amount of capital raised by firms (e.g. Rajan 1992).
20 The
quality of a country’s accounting standards and the legal protection given to creditors
are important determinants of industrial specialization. The results for the indicators
of financial depth and the aggregate amount of credit in an economy are somewhat
weaker. We address the potential problem with reverse causality by instrumenting for
financial endowments. The results show that exogenous variation in financial
endowments does shape industrial specialization.25
Since ours is one of the first papers approaching the relation between the financial
sector and specialization and trade, we have aimed at simplicity and clarity in the
empirical analysis. Extensions of this study might allow for other amendments
common in the empirical HOV-analysis. These specific extensions would be to allow
for cross-country technological and demand differences as suggested by Trefler
(1993), Davis and Weinstein (1996), and Harrigan (1997). Another interesting
extension would be to analyze the potential effects of financial markets on the choice
of technology. Since financial markets are supposed (and shown) to solve information
problems in the market place, they are likely to affect the choice of technology. Carlin
and Mayer (1999) take a first step in this direction by showing that the financial
system affects R&D.  To get a better understanding of its effect on technology, we
would also need a better grasp of why some industries are more dependent on external
financing than others. This might be a fruitful area for future research with
implications for the literatures on growth as well as international trade. Incorporating
other institutional factors would be another extension along the same lines. As long as
industries differ in their use of the services provided by these institutions (and the
services are non-tradable), we would expect the pattern of specialization to be
determined by institutional factors.
21
Finally, we might expect specialization and trade pattern identified in this paper to
disappear over time. Multinational corporations are supposedly insensitive to local
financing conditions. To the extent that MNC:s continue to increase their share of
international trade, local financial markets should exert a continuously smaller impact
on the pattern of production and trade. The same applies if financial markets
                                                                                                                                                              
20 The finding that banking sector concentration is conductive for the growth of financially dependent
industries reported in Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) also hinges on conditional convergence.
21 Naturally, measuring input requirements of institutional factors, and institutional quality is difficult.
That wage-setting institutions compressing the wage distribution can affect the industrial composition
is supported by evidence in Davis and Henrekson (2000).26
effectively become better integrated across countries over time.
22 Hence, it might be
fruitful to extend the analysis along the time dimension.
                                                       
22 Petersen and Rajan (2001) document an increase in the physical distance between small firms and
lenders in the US over time. This increase is correlated with higher bank productivity and hence,
constitutes evidence that financial development reduces the need for proximity between borrowers and
lenders.27
Appendix
Table A1. Correlations and summary statistics: Endowments





































Creditor 0.27 0.33 0.20 0.20 0.03 -0.36 0.08 -0.01 1
Minority 0.49
** 0.36 0.31 0.51
** -0.06 -0.25 0.45




















*** 0.03 0.05 0.61
*** 0.07 0.33 0.57
*** 1








Agrilw -0.02 -0.13 -0.12 -0.07 0.15 0.00 0.27 0.03 -0.39
* 0.40
* 0.11 -0.07 -0.45
** 0.23 1
Rwoodw -0.15 -0.28 -0.20 0.07 0.49
** -0.24 0.50
** 0.24 0-.16 0.28 0.27 0.00 -0.18 0.40
* 0.20 1





* 0.33 -0.06 0.63
*** 0.19 0.60
*** 1
Steelw -0.08 -0.12 -0.07 0.02 0.27 -0.30 0.25 0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.08 0.05 0.01 0.31 -0.03 0.59
*** 0.05 1
Mean 0.38 0.16 0.67 0.83 0.61 0.029 66 65 1.86 2.29 2.7 4.9 50,2 44.3 1.0 3752 18.7 1581
Stdev 0.27 0.15 0.30 0.42 0.23 0.013 10 11 1.06 1.42 1.1 2.4 5,8 12.5 1.4 4725 12.1 3292
75
th perc. 0.48 0.21 0.75 1.09 0.46 0.018 74 73 3 4 3.1 6.5 54,2 53.0 - - - -
25
th perc. 0.15 0.04 0.50 0.49 0.87 0.044 61 61 1 1 1.9 2.7 44,6 39.9 - - - -
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level, and * at the 10%-level.  The last two rows display the values of the observations belonging to the 75th and the 25th percentile
respectively.28
Table A2. Correlations and summary statistics: Intensities








Cvai 0.14 0.10 1
Capva 0.05 -0.13 -0.07 1
Woodint -0.06 -0.09 0.13 -0.11 1
Landuse -0.09 0.31
* -0.03 -0.13 -0.04 1
Elint1 -0.19 -0.22 0.54
*** -0.02 0.21 -0.05 1
Ironint -0.11 -0.06 0.20 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.14 1
Mean 0.34 0.07 0.15 0.41 1.7 0.03 185 0.03
Stdev 0.42 0.06 0.07 0.25 6.8 0.18 285 0.18
75th perc. 0.47 0.09 0.20 0.42 - - - -
25th perc. 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.26 - - - -
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level, and * at the 10%-level.  The last two
rows display the values of the observations belonging to the 75th and the 25th percentile respectively.
Table A3. Correlations and summary statistics: Dependent variables
Mean Stdev Correlations
Ln(rij) -0.164 0.482 1 -
Balassa -0.210 0.431 0.69
*** 1
Zfd 0.86 0.28 1 -
Wfd -0.12 0.19 0.74
*** 1
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level, and * at the 10%-level.29





3210 Wearing Apparel Canada
3220 Textiles, Apparel & Denmark
3230 Leather & Products Finland
3240 Footwear France
3310 Wood Products Germany
3320 Furnitures & Fixtures Greece
3410 Paper & Products Italy
3420 Printing & Publishing Japan
3520 Other Chemicals Mexico
1
3522 Drugs & Medicines Netherlands
3530 Petroleum Refineries New Zealand
3540 Petroleum & Coal Pr Norway
3550 Rubber Products Portugal
3560 Plastic Products, n Spain
3610 Pottery, China etc Sweden
3620 Glass & Products UK
3690 Non-Metallic Products USA




3825 Office & Computing
3830 Electrical Machinery
3832 Radio, TV &
Communication
3840 Transport Equipment




1 Accounting standards from 1983 are missing for Mexico.30
Data description
Dependent variables
rij = Qij/Cij = Qij/(Qij + Mij – Xij), where Qij is the production, Cij is the consumption, Mij are the imports
from the rest of the world, Xij are the exports to the rest of the world, of industry i in country j. Average
values 1989-91. Source: STAN. The definition is from Gustavsson et al. (1999).
Balassa = (Xij – Mij) / (Xij + Mij). Source: STAN.
Zik =  ∑ ∑ i ik ij i ik ij f m f x / , where xij and mij are the shares of exports (imports) of sector i from (to)
country j, and fik is the input requirement of factor k in sector i. The measure is called Zfd when using
external financing requirements and Zhc when using human capital requirements. Source: xij and mi  are
constructed from STAN average values in 1989-91, fik for external financing is FINDEP (Rajan and
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 , where fik is the input-requirement of factor k in sector i, Xij the
exports of sector i in country j, Mij the imports of sector i in country j, Bj is country j’s trade imbalance
and Cij country j’s consumption of good i. Qiw/GDPw is the share of world output of good i in world
GDP. The measure is called Wfd when using external finance requirements. Source: Xij , Mij  and Cij
from STAN average values 1989-91. fik for external finance is FINDEP. Qiw  the sum of production
over the 22 countries included in the study and GDPw is the sum of GDP for the countries in the study.
Bj = total export-total import of goods and services for 1990 from World Development Indicators.
Financial variables
External finance dependence:
FINDEP. Capital expenditure minus cash flows from operations divided by capital expenditures. Data
source: Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Financial sector development:
MCAP: Stock market capitalization to GDP, average 1989-91. Source: Beck et al (1999).
STRADE: Stock market total value traded to GDP, average 1989-91. Source: Beck et al (1999).
LLY: Liquid liabilities to GDP, average 1989-91. Source: Beck et al (1999).
DC: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP, average 1989-91.
Source: Beck et al (1999).
CONC: Market share of the three largest banks. Source: Beck et al (1999).
MARGIN: Net interest margin to total assets. Source: Beck et al (1999).
ACSTAN: Accounting standards 1990. Source: Rajan and Zingales (1998).
ACSTAN83: Accounting standards 1983. Source: Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Legal variables:
MINORITY: Index of minority share holder rights, range 0-6. Source: La Porta et.al. (1998).
CREDITOR: Index of creditor rights. Range 0-4. Source: La Porta et.al. (1998).31
RULELAW: International Country Risk (ICR) index of law and order tradition. Source: La Porta et.al.
(1998).
SCAND, GERMAN, FRENCH, ENGL: Dummies of legal origin. Source: La Porta et.al. (1998).
CIVIC: Index of the strength of norms in civic cooperation. Source: Knack and Keefer (1997).
Human capital
Human capital intensities:
POSTSEC: The share of post-secondary schooling in total employment, 1990, Swedish industries.
Source: SCB Regional Labor Statistics, unpublished.
AHI:  } ) / {( i j j ij POSTSEC WORKERS EMPLOYMENT × ∑ / number of countries. Source:
EMPLOYMENT from STAN average 1989-91, WORKERS from Penn World Tables 5.6.
Human capital endowment:
SECSCH: Average years of secondary schooling in the population over 25. Average 1985-90. Source:
Barro and Lee (2000).
SCIENW: Number of scientists and engineers per worker. Year 1990 or the closest available (1988-
93). Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook.
HCQ1: Indicator of labor force quality, based on international mathematics and science test scores.
Based on fixed world average test score. Source: Hanushek and Kimko (2000)
Physical capital
Physical capital intensities:
CVAI =  ∑ ∑ j ij j ij added value mation capitalfor   / , Average 1989-91. Source: STAN.
CAPVA = Capital stock/ Value added in UK. Average 1993-95. Source: OECD Statistical
Compendium, Industry, Science and Technology, Industrial Structure Statistics – Industrial Surveys.
Physical capital endowment:
KAPW1: KSTOCK/WORKERS. Capital per worker, thousands of dollars. Average 1988-90. Source:
KSTOCK: Real net capital stock in millions of US dollars. This is the accumulated, depreciated, and
deflated series (15 years, 13.33% depreciation rate) of gross fixed capital formation in each country.
Investment deflators were taken from Summers and Heston. Average 1988-90. From the Factor
endowments database, (FEDB) compiled by Maskus and Poterba.
Natural resources
Natural resource intensities:
LANDUSE: Agricultural land intensities: Dummy for food production (ISIC 311/2).
WOODINT: Definition: Millions of SEK worth of input of forestry products divided by millions of
SEK worth of production (times 100). Source: SCB (1992).
IRONINT: Use of iron ore. Dummy for iron & steel production (ISIC 3710).
ELINT1: Definition: Total amount of purchased electrical energy in megawatt hours divided by total
number of thousands of hours worked. Average value 1990/1991. Source: SCB Industristatistik.32
Natural resources endowment:
RWOODW: RWOOD/WORKERS. RWOOD: Round wood production, cubic meters. Average 1989-
91. Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook.
AGRILW: AGRILAND/WORKERS. AGRILAND: Area of arable land and land under permanent
crops or permanent pasture in thousands of hectares. Source: The Production Yearbook of the FAO.
Average 1988-90. FEDB.
ELECW: ELEC/WORKERS. ELEC: Indigenous production of electricity (Gwh). Average 1989-91.
Source: OECD Basic Energy Statistics, various issues.
STEELW: STEEL/WORKERS. STEEL: Crude steel and pig iron production in metric tons. Average
1989-91. Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook.
General country factors
GDPPC: GDP per capita. Average 1988-90. Source: Penn World Tables 5.6.
GDPPW: GDP per worker. Average 1988-90. Source: Penn World Tables 5.6.
POP: Population in thousands. Average 1988-90. Source: Penn World Tables 5.6.
WORKERS: Workforce in thousands. Average 1988-90. Source: Own calculations
GDPPC*POP/GDPPW.
GDP: Total GDP. Average 1988-90. Source: Own calculations GDPPC*POP.
TOTEXP: Total manufacturing export value in dollars. Average 1989-91. Source: STAN.
TOTIMP: Total manufacturing import value in dollars. Average 1989-91. Source: STAN.
GOVSH: Government share of employment. Defined as government employment/WORKERS.
Average value 1989-91. Source: OECD Economic Outlook.33
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Table 1. Determinants of specialization (defined as in 3.6). Basic regressions.










































































































































% increase in rij
1 10.8 12.2 - 5.4 7.0 - 6.1 8.7 - 8.5
ADJ R
2 0.300 0.300 0.281 0.289 0.290 0.286 0.295 0.330 0.282 0.285
# OBS. 619 619 619 619 619 619 619 587 619 619
Robust t-values in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level, and * at the 10%-level. Regressions include industry and country
fixed effects. 
1 The interpretation of this value is given in the text.38
Table 2. . Determinants of specialization (defined as in 3.6). Different aspects of the financial system.
























































2 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.30
# OBS. 619 619 619 619 619 619 619 619 619 619
Robust t-values in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level, and * at the 10%-level. All regressions include indicators of human-
and physical capital, agricultural- and forestland, as well as industry and country fixed effects.39
Table 3. Specialization sensitivity analysis

















































































































































Robust t-values in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level, and * at the 10%-level. Each cell refers to an individual regression and shows the point estimate of
the interaction between financial dependence and financial development. All regressions include indicators of human- and physical capital, agricultural- and forestland, as well as industry and
country fixed effects. In row 1, the dependent variable is (Xij – Mij) / (Xij + Mij), in rows 2-5 it is ln(rij). In row 2, the number of scientists per worker (SCIENW), rather than secondary schooling
(SECSCH), is used to measure human capital endowments. In row 3, British capital intensities (CAPVA), than the capital formation to value added ratio (CVAI), are used to measure capital
intensities. In row 4, the US is excluded from the regressions. In row 5, ELINT1×ln(ELECW) and IRONINT×ln(STEELW) are added to the regressions.40
Table 4. Instrumental variable analysis of specialization

























































































































c 2.79 1.80 2.35 2.72 1.61 0.62 1.18 2.54 2.35 1.49
Robust t-values in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level, and * at the 10%-level. Each cell refers to an individual regression and shows the point estimate of
the interaction between financial dependence and financial development. All regressions include indicators of human- and physical capital, agricultural- and forestland, as well as industry and
country fixed effects. The dependent variable is ln(rij). In panel 1, we instrument indicators of financial development with the index of the strength of norms in civic participation (CIVIC) from
Knack and Keefer (1997). In panel 2, we instrument indicators of financial development with the “rule of law”-index and dummies of legal origin.
a)     The F-statistic (and p-values) on the excluded instruments in the first stage regression.
b)  Gives the correlation coefficients (and p-values) of the correlation between the residuals from the second stage regression with the instrument.
c)     The null hypothesis of the overidentification test is that the residuals from the second stage regression are not correlated with the instruments. Critical values for the test (χ
2, 3 d.f.):
        5%=4.11, 10%=6.25.41
Table 5. Rank test between the factor content of net trade
              (Zjk defined as in equation 4.1) and endowment
Production factor Proxy Kendalls rank test













*** Indicate significance at 1%-level, ** at 5%-level, * at 10%-level42
Table 6. Factor content of net trade (defined as in equation 4.1). Basic regressions.















































































































































2 0.133 0.459 0.467 0.468 0.295 0.381 0.090 0.099 0.071 0.081
N . o b s 2 02 02 02 02 02 02 01 92 02 0
*** Indicate significance at 1%-level, ** at 5%-level, * at 10%-level. t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses.43
Table 7. Factor content of net trade (defined as in equation 4.1).
Different aspects of the financial system


















2 0.490 0.571 0.568
# OBS. 20 20 20
Robust t-values in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** at
the 5%-level, and * at the 10%-level. All regressions include indicators of
human- and physical capital, agricultural- and forestlands.